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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
This matter is before this court on appeal from an order 
of June 9, 1999, in which the appellant, Allstate Insurance 
Company, asserts that we have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. S 1291 pursuant to the collateral order doctrine. 
Appellee, plaintiff Maureen Bacher, was involved in a two- 
car accident on August 5, 1994. Allstate, which insured 
both vehicles, paid Bacher the $15,000 policy limit as a tort 
claimant under the policy covering the other car. In 
addition, Bacher submitted a claim for underinsured 
motorists benefits ("UIM") under her policy. A little over one 
year later, after having made two offers to settle for less 
than the policy limit, Allstate paid the full $30,000 allowed 
by the policy for UIM benefits, thus pretermitting an 
arbitration proceeding of her claim. Bacher and her 
husband Richard subsequently instituted this action in the 
district court seeking compensatory and punitive damages 
alleging that Allstate processed her UIM claim in bad faith 
contrary to Pennsylvania statutory law. See 42 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. S 8371 (West 1998). 
 
On July 6, 1998, a magistrate judge ordered Allstate to 
comply with certain of the Bachers' discovery requests, 
including a request for information regarding all prior 
actions filed against Allstate in any jurisdiction since 
January 1, 1994, alleging bad faith with respect to 
uninsured or underinsured motorist claims. The order 
instructed Allstate to disclose the amount paid to satisfy 
any judgment or settlement in each prior action. Following 
Allstate's motion for reconsideration, the magistrate judge 
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issued an order on February 9, 1999, limiting the discovery 
to prior bad faith actions brought in Pennsylvania. The 
district court affirmed the magistrate judge's order on 
March 25, 1999. Allstate then moved for reconsideration 
and on June 9, 1999, the district court issued an order 
denying reconsideration but prohibiting Bacher or her 
counsel from disclosing or using the settlement information 
outside the boundaries of this litigation. 
 
Allstate eventually complied with these orders to the 
extent of identifying the prior bad faith actions except that 
Allstate refused to disclose the amount which it paid to 
settle any such action. Allstate filed a notice of appeal on 
July 8, 1999, from the district court's order denying its 
motion for reconsideration. The underlying action still is 
pending in the district court leading the Bachers to urge 
that we dismiss the appeal. 
 
On this appeal, Allstate contends that it should not have 
to disclose the amount it paid to settle other cases. In this 
regard it points out that at least some of the settlements 
were confidential so that their disclosure would violate 
confidentiality agreements. Moreover, it contends that 
disclosure of settlements is not reasonably calculated to 
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and is against 
public policy. 
 
Allstate, however, faces a jurisdictional hurdle for"[a]s a 
general rule, discovery orders are not final orders of the 
district court for purposes of obtaining appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291." In re Ford Motor Co., 
110 F.3d 954, 958 (3d Cir. 1997), citing Hahnemann Univ. 
Hosp. v. Edgar, 74 F.3d 456, 461 (3d Cir. 1996). It 
contends, however, that we have jurisdiction pursuant to 
the collateral order doctrine first recognized in Cohen v. 
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 
1221 (1949). See Smith v. Bic Corp., 869 F.2d 194, 198 (3d 
Cir. 1989) ("We have never held as a blanket rule that 
discovery orders are not appealable. Rather, we address 
each issue using two vehicles: the collateral order doctrine 
. . . and the petition for writ of mandamus."). We recently 
described the collateral order doctrine as follows: 
 
       [T]he collateral order doctrine, first enunciated by the 
       Supreme Court in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan 
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       Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 
       (1949), provides a narrow exception to the general rule 
       permitting appellate review only of final orders. An 
       appeal of a nonfinal order will lie if (1) the order from 
       which the appellant appeals conclusively determines 
       the disputed question; (2) the order resolves an 
       important issue that is completely separate from the 
       merits of the dispute; and (3) the order is effectively 
       unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. 
 
Ford, 110 F.3d at 958. 
 
We have held that the requirements of the collateral order 
doctrine are satisfied when a party appeals a discovery 
order involving information which the party claims to be 
privileged or to constitute a trade secret. See Montgomery 
County v. Microvote Corp., 175 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(attorney-client and work product privileges); Ford, 110 
F.3d at 957-64 (same); Smith, 869 F.2d at 198-99 (trade 
secrets). Our most extensive discussion of the jurisdictional 
issue was in Ford, where we addressed each of the 
prerequisites for application of the collateral order doctrine. 
We concluded that the doctrine was satisfied in that case 
because (1) the order requiring production of allegedly 
privileged documents left no room for further consideration 
by the district court; (2) we could resolve the privilege issue 
on appeal without delving into the issues in the underlying 
litigation; (3) the interests protected by the attorney-client 
and work product privileges are important as compared to 
the interests favoring the final judgment rule; and (4) there 
could not be effective review on appeal after final judgment 
because the privileged information already would have been 
disclosed. See Ford, 110 F.3d at 958-64. With regard to the 
last of these prerequisites, we commented as follows: 
 
       Appeal after final judgment cannot remedy the breach 
       in confidentiality occasioned by erroneous disclosure of 
       protected materials. At best, on appeal after final 
       judgment, an appellate court could send the case back 
       for re-trial without use of the protected materials. At 
       that point, however, the cat is already out of the bag. 
 
       . . . 
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       Attorneys cannot unlearn what has been disclosed to 
       them in discovery; they are likely to use such material 
       for evidentiary leads, strategy decisions, or the like. 
       More colorfully, there is no way to unscramble the egg 
       scrambled by the disclosure; the baby has been thrown 
       out with the bath water. 
 
Id. at 963 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
Other courts of appeals have rejected our approach, 
however, and have declined to exercise jurisdiction under 
the collateral order doctrine over appeals from discovery 
orders, even when privilege issues are involved. See, e.g., 
FDIC v. Ogden Corp., 202 F.3d 454, 458 & n.2 (1st Cir. 
2000) ("[D]iscovery orders generally are not thought to come 
within [the collateral order doctrine]"; the "perfect example" 
of a discovery order that is not appealable under the 
doctrine is one involving a party's claim of attorney-client 
privilege.); Dellwood Farms, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 128 F.3d 
1122, 1125 (7th Cir. 1997) ("[A] discovery order is not 
deemed collateral even if it is an order denying a claim of 
privilege. We so held emphatically in [two prior cases], and 
this is the view of the other circuits as well, with the partial 
exception of the Third Circuit [citing Ford ].") (citations 
omitted); Simmons v. City of Racine, 37 F.3d 325, 327 (7th 
Cir. 1994) ("Discovery orders are generally not appealable 
. . . as collateral orders. This is true even of discovery 
orders issued over an objection that the information at 
issue is privileged. Defendants have suggested no reason 
that the privilege they assert, the so-called `informer's 
privilege' . . . should stand on a different footing from the 
attorney-client privilege or the executive privilege, neither of 
which confers upon its holder the right to take an 
immediate appeal under section 1291 from an adverse 
discovery order.") (citations omitted); Boughton v. Cotter 
Corp., 10 F.3d 746, 749-50 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that 
"virtually every case in other circuits" has held that orders 
compelling disclosure of information claimed to be subject 
to the attorney-client privilege are not reviewable as 
collateral orders) (citing cases). 
 
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit explained the 
reasons for prohibiting immediate review of discovery 
orders: 
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       [T]he considerations underlying the rule against review 
       of interlocutory orders apply with particular force in 
       the discovery context because that process has a 
       special potential for spawning rulings that aggrieved 
       parties would seek to appeal. The process of turning 
       over private-and often damaging-information to an 
       adversary inevitably creates friction. The sheer number 
       of discovery rulings and the myriad procedural 
       requirements governing them, provide fertile soil for the 
       growth of appealable orders. Allowing immediate appeal 
       of the orders resolving discovery disputes would only 
       disrupt and delay district court proceedings and clog 
       the courts of appeals with matters more properly 
       managed by trial courts familiar with the parties and 
       their controversy. 
 
       . . . 
 
       The dangers of a trade secrets exception to the 
       nonappealability of discovery orders should be 
       apparent. A judicially created exception to 
       nonappealability for categories of sensitive information 
       is the quintessential slippery slope. Many parties faced 
       with discovery requests are apt to regard the 
       information sought as sensitive or confidential and seek, 
       at a minimum, to delay its disclosure through an 
       interlocutory trip to an appellate court. 
 
MDK, Inc. v. Mike's Train House, Inc., 27 F.3d 116, 119-20 
& n.2 (4th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted) (emphasis added) 
(declining to follow our holding in Smith). 
 
The question before us, then, is whether we should 
extend our holdings in Smith, Ford, and Montgomery County 
to Allstate's appeal, in light of the narrower approach to the 
collateral order doctrine taken by other courts of appeals. 
Allstate is not claiming protection of trade secrets, nor is it 
claiming a traditionally recognized "privilege" such as the 
attorney-client privilege. Allstate does claim, however, that 
the district court's discovery order will force it to turn over 
highly sensitive information which, notwithstanding the 
district court's confidentiality order, someday may be used 
against it by the Bachers' attorneys to bring about a larger 
settlement in this action or in future bad faith actions. 
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There is some force to Allstate's jurisdictional argument 
for, as our opinion in Ford indicates, "the cat [will] already 
[be] out of the bag" regardless of whatever relief we could 
provide on an appeal after final judgment. See Ford, 110 
F.3d at 963. Nevertheless, we must be careful not to open 
the door to a flood of collateral order appeals from discovery 
orders requiring disclosure of unprivileged information 
which might be characterized as "sensitive." Thus, while 
there may be very good reasons to overturn the district 
court's order, if we take jurisdiction here we may have 
difficulty drawing the jurisdictional line in future cases. 
 
We conclude that we should draw the line in this case 
and thus should dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
In this regard, we are influenced by the Supreme Court 
opinions in Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 119 S.Ct. 
1915 (1999), and Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, 
Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 114 S.Ct. 1992 (1994). In Cunningham, 
the Court held that an order imposing sanctions on a 
party's attorney for discovery abuses was not immediately 
appealable under the collateral order doctrine. 
Cunningham, 119 S.Ct. at 1919-23. In so ruling, the Court 
indicated that the separability requirement of the collateral 
order doctrine was not met: 
 
       We do not think . . . that appellate review of a 
       sanctions order can remain completely separate from 
       the merits 
 
       . . . 
 
       [A] Rule 37(a) sanctions order often will be inextricably 
       intertwined with the merits of the action. An evaluation 
       of the appropriateness of sanctions may require the 
       reviewing court to inquire into the importance of the 
       information sought or the adequacy or truthfulness of 
       a response. Some of the sanctions in this case were 
       based on the fact that petitioner [the sanctioned 
       attorney] provided partial responses and objections to 
       some of the defendants' discovery requests. To evaluate 
       whether those sanctions were appropriate, an appellate 
       court would have to assess the completeness of 
       petitioner's responses. Such an inquiry would differ 
       only marginally from an inquiry into the merits and 
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       counsels against application of the collateral order 
       doctrine. Perhaps not every discovery sanction will be 
       inextricably intertwined with the merits, but we have 
       consistently eschewed a case-by-case approach to 
       deciding whether an order is sufficiently collateral. 
 
Id. at 1920-21 (citations omitted). Similarly, on this appeal 
review of the district court's order necessarily will entail 
some determination as to whether the settlement 
information sought by the Bachers is relevant to the merits 
of the bad faith claim and/or their claim for punitive 
damages. Accordingly, it is questionable as to whether the 
separability requirement is satisfied. 
 
Further, the Court's statement in Cunningham that we 
should not apply the collateral order doctrine on a"case- 
by-case" basis indicates that we should not attempt to 
carve out case-by-case exceptions to the general rule that 
discovery orders are not immediately appealable. We believe 
that the Supreme Court would not approve an approach 
which requires a determination in each case as to whether 
the particular material to be produced is sufficiently 
"sensitive" to warrant immediate appellate review. See also 
MDK, 27 F.3d at 120 ("A judicially created exception to 
nonappealability for categories of sensitive information is 
the quintessential slippery slope."). Further, the Court 
indicated in Digital Equipment that the collateral order 
doctrine should apply to broad categories of interlocutory 
orders, without concern for the individual circumstances of 
particular cases. See Digital Equipment, 511 U.S. at 868, 
114 S.Ct. at 1996 ("We have accordingly described the 
conditions for collateral order appeal as stringent, and have 
warned that the issue of appealability under S 1291 is to be 
determined for the entire category to which a claim belongs, 
without regard to the chance that the litigation at hand 
might be speeded, or a particular injustice averted, by a 
prompt appellate court decision.") (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 
The Court's decision in Digital Equipment warns that the 
collateral order doctrine is "narrow" and that claims for its 
applicability should be subjected to "broad scrutiny." See 
id. at 868, 114 S.Ct. at 1996 ("[W]e have. . . repeatedly 
stressed that the `narrow' exception should stay that way 
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and never be allowed to swallow the general rule that a 
party is entitled to a single appeal, to be deferred until final 
judgment has been entered . . . .") (citation omitted); see 
also We, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 174 F.3d 322, 324-25 
(3d Cir. 1999) (emphasizing that the collateral order 
doctrine is to be construed narrowly). The following passage 
from Digital Equipment indicates that the doctrine should 
not be applied to the myriad of district court orders which 
arguably will cause the irretrievable loss of a party's rights: 
 
       [T]he strong bias of S 1291 against piecemeal appeals 
       almost never operates without some cost. A fully 
       litigated case can no more be untried than the law's 
       proverbial bell can be unrung, and almost every 
       pretrial or trial order might be called `effectively 
       unreviewable' in the sense that relief from error can 
       never extend to rewriting history. Thus, erroneous 
       evidentiary rulings, grants or denials of attorney 
       disqualification, and restrictions on the rights of 
       intervening parties, may burden litigants in ways that 
       are only imperfectly reparable by appellate reversal of 
       a final district court judgment; and other errors, real 
       enough, will not seem serious enough to warrant 
       reversal at all, when reviewed after a long trial on the 
       merits . . . . But if immediate appellate review were 
       available every such time, Congress's final decision rule 
       would end up a pretty puny one, and so the mere 
       identification of some interest that would be 
       `irretrievably lost' has never sufficed to meet the third 
       Cohen requirement. 
 
Digital Equipment, 511 U.S. at 872, 114 S.Ct. at 1998 
(citations omitted). 
 
In light of Cunningham and Digital Equipment and the 
approach taken by other courts of appeals we determine 
that we should not extend our case law beyond the narrow 
categories of trade secrets and traditionally recognized 
privileges, such as attorney-client and work product. While 
the sensitive nature of the material at issue here may 
separate Allstate from the "ordinary" party who seeks to 
appeal a discovery order, Cunningham and Digital 
Equipment counsel against application of the collateral 
order doctrine on such a case-by-case basis. Accordingly, 
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we are constrained to resist any temptation to extend 
Smith, Ford, and Montgomery County  any further.1 
 
We make one final point on this appeal. The parties 
should not infer from our opinion that we in any way are 
motivated by the belief that the requirement for disclosure 
of the details of the settlements was appropriate. Quite to 
the contrary, we find the disclosure order troubling because 
so many factors may lead to a settlement in any particular 
case. Accordingly, it is not immediately evident why 
revealing the amount of settlements in other cases can be 
helpful here. Indeed, we can foresee that an attempt to use 
evidence of these settlements at trial could require 
significant exploration of the proceedings in other cases, 
thereby causing the parties to lose the proper focus in this 
case. Moreover, we can understand how by allowing a party 
to use evidence of settlements a court could discourage 
settlements in the future. Nevertheless in light of our 
absence of jurisdiction we cannot intercede. 
 
For the foregoing reasons we will dismiss the appeal for 
lack of jurisdiction. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Of course, immediate appellate review of discovery orders may be 
available under appropriate circumstances by means of a petition for a 
writ of mandamus or a permissive interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1292. See Simmons 37 F.3d at 328-29 & n.2. While we recognize that 
we can treat a notice of appeal as a petition for mandamus, we will not 
consider that possibility here because Allstate in its extensive briefing 
and in response to our clerk's inquiry on the jurisdictional issue has not 
requested that we do so. See br. at 26-35; reply br. 15-18. This omission 
must have been intentional as Allstate has cited and relied heavily on 
Ford, a case in which the appellant as an alternative to invoking 
appellate jurisdiction, sought mandamus relief. We also point out that 
Allstate did not file a motion asking for a district court certification 
so 
that it could have sought permission to file an interlocutory appeal 
under 28 U.S.C. S 1292 from the order of June 9, 1999. 
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